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QUID WITHOUT A QUO: HARASSMENT LAW CHANGES ITS
TERMINOLOGY WITHOUT CHANGING ITS MEANING
JOEL ISRAEL*

INTRODUCTION
The goal has not changed and neither has the concept. Today’s quid pro
quo sexual harassment cases are often factually similar to those from the past
twenty years and still seek to protect the victimized employee. The prototypical
case still involves the supervisor and the employee, the former demanding sexual favors from the latter, and threatening negative employment repercussions if
the employee does not submit. If the employee proves there were actual repercussions, the employer is held strictly liable for the supervisor’s actions. If there
are no repercussions, the employee may seek redress under a different category
of harassment case. Under either scenario, the employee can obtain a remedy.
Since sexual harassment was first addressed by courts more than twentyfive years ago, the general analysis of this form of gender discrimination has not
undergone any dramatic alterations. While the concept has not changed, however, the terminology has, and scholars and courts continue to debate how best
to protect the victimized employee.
Traditionally, there have been two categories of sexual harassment under
Title VII: “quid pro quo” and “hostile work environment.” As the First Circuit
stated fifteen years ago, “[t]he gist of a quid pro quo claim is that [an employee]
1
is threatened by [a supervisor] with demands for a sexual encounter.” If the
employee rejects the demands, then the supervisor’s threats may come to frui2
tion and the employee may lose her job. Conversely, the employee may accede
3
to the supervisor’s demands and be rewarded for her compliance. If the employee is threatened, and then rewarded or punished, she is a victim of quid pro
4
quo harassment, regardless of whether there was a sexual encounter. In con-

* Duke University School of Law, J.D. ‘03. The author would like to thank, in addition to the
work of the Journal staff, the tremendous help of three individuals: Katherine Bartlett, Dean and A.
Kenneth Pye Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; Nancy Abell, chair of the Employment Law Department at Paul, Hastings, Janofsky, and Walker; and Peggy Tobolowsky, Professor
and Associate Chair of the Department of Criminal Justice, University of North Texas.
1. Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 913 (1st Cir. 1988).
2. Id. This note will refer to the employee victim as “she” and the harassing supervisor as “he”
because that is the most common situation in sexual harassment cases. This note will not discuss the
debate over what constitutes a supervisor for purposes of employer liability. For more on this topic,
see, e.g., Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that new agency managers had made threats constituting a tangible employment action, thus affirmative defenses were not
available to plaintiff); Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the employer could not be held liable for a co-worker’s sexually harassing behavior).
3. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 913.
4. Id.
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trast, the focus of a hostile work environment case is the supervisor’s or coworker’s behavior, and the harm is established when unwelcome acts of a sexual
nature, ranging from sexual speech to offensive behavior, are so severe and per5
vasive that they interfere with the employee’s job performance.
The factual predicates in many cases could be characterized interchangea6
bly as either hostile work environment or quid pro quo harassment. However,
the two categories have traditionally been separated in terms of their definitions,
in how they have been applied by the courts, and in the standard of liability applied to the employer in each case. For example, quid pro quo has been categorized as conduct that is malum in se, or wrongful in and of itself, and thus subject
to strict liability regardless of the circumstances or the defenses proffered by the
7
employer and supervisor. Hostile work environment, on the other hand, is only
malum prohibitum: prohibited not because it is wrong in itself, “but because of the
8
negative effects that are associated with it.”
This Note examines the twenty-five year history of quid pro quo sexual
harassment, from its inception in the late 1970s through its treatment over the
past five years, during which its importance and utility in the harassment lexicon has been greatly diminished. It argues that over the last few years the term
“tangible employment action” has replaced “quid pro quo” as the more functional label used to encompass the form of sexual harassment so reprehensible
that an employer should be subject to strict liability. The label, “tangible employment action,” however, is just that—a label—and retains the concept of
9
“quid pro quo.”
Although the dividing line between quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment, based on the existence of a tangible employment action,
has been clarified by this modification, it is arguable that the only change is in
semantics, and thus it is a distinction without a difference. Still, this distinction
may be more significant than it first appears. By viewing the conditioning of job
benefits on sexual favors as a tangible employment action, courts have created a
road map that aids the victimized employee and strengthens the ability of females to achieve the goals of Title VII. With the goal of equality in mind, and in
order to best protect the victimized employee, quid pro quo harassment should
remain a strict liability offense, punishable regardless of an employer’s defenses.
As a result, it should retain its separate category as distinct from hostile work
environment harassment, which permits affirmative defenses.

5. See Sandra Day O’Connor, The Effects of Gender in the Federal Courts: The Final Report of the
Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force: The Quality of Justice, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 1055 (1994).
6. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 n.18 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that the elements
of quid pro quo harassment a plaintiff must prove are similar to those of hostile environment harassment).
7. Steven Aden, “Harm in Asking”: A Reply to Eugene Scalia and an Analysis of the Paradigm Shift
in the Supreme Court’s Title VII Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 477,
492 (1999).
8. Id. at 493.
9. As discussed later, a tangible employment action “constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
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While much scholarly research has focused on the hostile work environment side of sexual harassment, far fewer scholars have devoted articles to quid
pro quo harassment. This Note attempts to bridge that gap by surveying quid
pro quo’s history and, more importantly, by examining how lower courts have
followed the Supreme Court’s 1998 holdings in the tangible employment action
domain. It will also explain whether or not the current system of liability is appropriate.
Part I of this Note describes the history of quid pro quo harassment’s origins, from Title VII’s creation to early harassment cases and paradigms. Part II
discusses the Supreme Court’s treatment of quid pro quo harassment, beginning
10
in 1986 with Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson and continuing in 1998 with the
11
landmark opinions Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc.
12
v. Ellerth. Part III evaluates the success of the Supreme Court’s holdings, analyzes subsequent lower-court treatment of quid pro quo harassment, and demonstrates how the term, but not the concept, has been substantially diminished
by the advent of the tangible employment action. Part IV illustrates how various courts and commentators have debated the viability of quid pro quo as a
discrete category of sexual harassment and looks at a variety of arguments for
which standard of liability should apply. Part V argues that tangible employment action is similar in concept to quid pro quo, and that the goals of Title VII
are best served when an employer, within the context of tangible employment
action claims, is subject to strict liability. Even with a strict liability standard, an
employer can still take preventative or corrective measures to avoid future harassment and employee suits or to thwart a supervisor who takes advantage of
his position of authority.
I. THE ORIGINS OF QUID PRO QUO SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. Title VII and Early Recognition
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that an employer may not
“fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
13
sex, or national origin.” Congress added the prohibition of sex discrimination
to Title VII after the race, color, religion and national origin categories had been
14
established. In fact, the gender discrimination provision was added at literally
15
the last minute. As a result, there is little legislative history regarding the rea16
sons for its inclusion. In addition, the terms “quid pro quo” and “hostile work

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

477 U.S. 57 (1986).
524 U.S. 775 (1998).
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2001).
See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63.
Id. at 63-64 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577-2584 (1964)).
See id. at 64.
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environment” are not mentioned in Title VII but are causes of action that have
been developed independent of legislative initiative.
Professor Catharine MacKinnon is credited with creating the distinction
17
between “quid pro quo” and “hostile environment” sexual harassment. In her
1979 book Sexual Harassment of Working Women, MacKinnon defined “quid pro
quo” harassment as sexual harassment “in which sexual compliance is ex18
changed, or proposed to be exchanged, for an employment opportunity.” She
argued that quid pro quo and hostile environment claims emerged from the
same discriminatory intent, and that both actions discriminatorily define women
as “sexual objects” and thus exclude other possibile descriptions, such as “capa19
ble employees.”
In 1980, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) followed MacKinnon’s work by defining sexual harassment in regulations promulgated under Title VII and identifying two types: “quid pro quo” and “hostile
20
environment.” Though the EEOC Guidelines are not controlling on courts,
21
they may properly be used for guidance.
The hostile work environment classification originated in both form and
substance from already-existing Title VII racial harassment law, making the extension into gender discrimination a natural progression. One scholar states,
however, that the elements of quid pro quo were created “virtually out of whole
cloth,” meaning the cause of action appears to have had no predecessor similar
22
in nature. The logic of this argument is that quid pro quo harassment involving sex had no parallel in the racial discrimination context, but could fit into the
23
emerging area of gender discrimination. The quid pro quo cause of action was
born because it came to be regarded by many as “too reprehensible to escape li24
ability.”

17. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION (1979).
18. Id. at 32.
19. Id.
20. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2002). The Guidelines state:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of title VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
constitute harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or
implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.
Subsections (1) and (2) define “quid pro quo” sexual harassment, and (3) defines “hostile environment.”
21. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). The Court referred to the Guidelines as “‘a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.’” Id. at 142. The
weight to be accorded the Guidelines depends upon “‘the thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.’” Id.
22. Aden, supra note 7, at 483.
23. Id. at 486.
24. Id.
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B. Early Cases Discuss Quid Pro Quo
In 1977, the D.C. Circuit Court first recognized quid pro quo sexual har25
assment, though not by name, as a violation of Title VII in Barnes v. Costle. In
Barnes, a female government employee refused her male supervisor’s sexual ad26
vances and was subsequently terminated in retaliation. In holding that the
employer violated Title VII by discriminating on the basis of sex, the Court described gender as “an indispensable factor in the job-retention condition of
27
which [the plaintiff] complains.” The discrimination led to “the exaction of a
condition which, but for his or her sex, the employee would not have faced,”
28
thus establishing what was essentially a quid pro quo claim.
Other federal courts followed suit by holding employers strictly liable for
29
30
similar instances of sexual harassment. Henson v. City of Dundee was the first
published federal decision to use the term “quid pro quo” expressly to describe
a type of sex discrimination, when it stated that “[a]n employer may not require
31
sexual consideration from an employee as a quid pro quo for job benefits.” The
plaintiff in Henson was a police dispatcher who claimed that her police chief
“prevented her from attending the local police academy because she refused to
32
have sexual relations with him.” The Eleventh Circuit held that quid pro quo
discrimination occurs when a woman refuses sexual advances and consequently
33
is “deprived of a job benefit which she was otherwise qualified to receive.”
When the supervisor uses “the means furnished to him by the employer to accomplish the prohibited purpose,” he is acting within the scope of his employ34
ment and it is logical to hold the employer liable. In its analysis, the Henson
court reviewed prior attempts by other courts to set out a test, and ultimately
modeled its own after the Supreme Court’s McDonnell Douglas Corporation v.
35
Green opinion. The court delineated five factors the plaintiff must establish to
36
state a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment:

25. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
26. See id. at 985, 992.
27. Id. at 992.
28. Id. at 990 n.55.
29. See, e.g., Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 513-14 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that once quid pro quo
harassment is established, the employer is “ipso facto” liable); Horn v. Duke Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d
599, 604-606 (7th Cir. 1985) (adopting EEOC’s rule on strict liability for a supervisor’s acts of sexual
harassment); Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that knowledge is
imputed to employers when a supervisor attempts to retaliate after making sexual advances to an
employee); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that quid pro quo
harassment “is every bit as deleterious to the remedial purposes of Title VII as other unlawful employment practices”).
30. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 911 n.22 (11th Cir. 1982).
31. Id. at 908.
32. Id. at 900.
33. Id. at 909.
34. Id. at 910.
35. McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Supreme Court laid out
four factors necessary for a complainant in a Title VII case to establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination. The prima facie case may be established by showing:
(i) that [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications,
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(1) The employee is a member of the protected class; (2) She was subjected to
unwelcome sexual harassment to which members of the opposite sex had not
been subjected; (3) She applied and was qualified for a position for which the
employer was accepting applications; (4) That despite her qualifications she was
rejected; (5) That after her rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to accept applicants who possessed complainant’s qualifica37
tions.

Finally, the court added that a prima facie case may vary depending on the facts.
For example, in cases where submission to unwanted advances is either an express or implied condition of receiving a job benefit, the employee “need not
prove . . . that she actually applied for a given position since such an application
38
would have been futile.”
Following Henson, a job application process case, other courts expanded the
original five factors to cover other situations. One court, for example, held that a
plaintiff must show that she was subjected to sexual advances and that her reac39
tion to those advances affected “tangible aspects of . . . employment.” These
tangible aspects could include “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges”
40
of the plaintiff’s employment. Courts have also held that the quid pro quo defendant had no affirmative defense, but may rebut the prima facie case by
showing that the alleged behavior “either did not take place or that it did not af41
fect a tangible aspect of the plaintiff’s employment.” These decisions extended
quid pro quo beyond the scope of the application process.
In addition, courts after Henson have held that quid pro quo harassment
comprises both refusal cases, in which the employee rejects her supervisor’s advances and suffers a tangible employment action, and submission cases, in
which the employee accepts her supervisor’s “quid” to avoid a negative em42
ployment action. In the context of a refusal case, the substance of the claim is
that a tangible job benefit or detriment was conditioned on the employee submitting to the supervisor’s sexual blackmail and that adverse consequences fol43
lowed from her refusal to submit. Unfulfilled threats, however, are actionable

he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications. Id. at
802.
36. Henson, 682 F.2d at 911 n.22.
37. Id.
38. Id. Following Henson, different courts have applied different rationales as their basis for
holding the employer strictly liable, and a discussion of those justifications will follow in Section IV.
39. See, e.g., Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988) (adding that the fact-finder
must determine if the supervisor’s advances were unwelcome).
40. See, e.g., Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that employee’s
assignments, raises and promotions were conditioned on continued acquiescence to supervisor’s
sexual demands).
41. See, e.g., Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 898.
42. See, e.g., Karibian, 14 F.3d at 777.
43. See Carrero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989) (harassing supervisor
gave employee negative evaluation after she complained of his harassing behavior, and employee
was demoted).
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only as hostile work environment harassment claims, rather than quid pro quo,
44
because there is a quid (threat) without a quo (subsequent action).
Although lower courts consistently accepted quid pro quo as a discrete
45
category of sex discrimination, with its distinction as “[t]he most oppressive
46
and invidious type of workplace sexual harassment,” their interpretation of the
scope of quid pro quo was varied. As a result, the development of quid pro quo
has not been nearly as straightforward as the discussion of its history so far suggests. One scholar argues that in following the standards set forth by the Su47
preme Court in McDonnell, Henson might have made quid pro quo “redundant
of existing law literally from the day it was recognized,” and thus a superfluous
48
category all along. Furthermore, the Second Circuit in 1994 transformed the
49
Henson five-part test to another multi-part test, and the newer test was funda50
mentally different from the first even though it was supposed to be the same.
As the Ninth Circuit noted, “Five-part, seven-part or even ten-part tests fre51
quently serve only to obfuscate the real inquiry.” This criticism will be further
discussed in Section IV, but the suggestion that the two different tests might
have laid out two different concepts is illustrative of the complexities and ambiguities surrounding the history of quid pro quo.
Another debate is which standard of liability should apply. The Seventh
Circuit concluded that perhaps quid pro quo would be more effective if an employer’s liability was determined on the basis of a negligence standard rather
52
than on the basis of a strict liability standard. The Fifth Circuit, meanwhile,
broke from the common approach of strict liability by excusing an employer
from liability when the employer had taken prompt remedial action to address
53
an employee’s quid pro quo grievance. In doing so, this circuit affirmed a district court decision declaring that it could not apply agency principles because
that would result in strict liability to the employer, and “the Fifth Circuit . . . has
54
made clear that Title VII is not a strict liability statute.” Thus, the implication
44. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
45. Eugene Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 307, 309 (1998).
46. Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 1994).
47. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
48. Scalia, supra note 45, at 324.
49. See Karibian, 14 F.3d at 778, stating:
The relevant inquiry in a quid pro quo case is whether the supervisor has linked tangible
job benefits to the acceptance or rejection of sexual advances. It is enough to show that the
supervisor used the employee’s acceptance or rejection of his advances as the basis for a
decision affecting the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of the employee’s job.
50. Scalia, supra note 45, at 324.
51. Nichols, 42 F.3d at 513.
52. See, e.g., Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 505-06 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per
curiam) (Kanne, J., concurring) (arguing that employee should win if she can prove employer negligence in failing to address quid pro quo threats). A further discussion of this topic will follow in
Section IV.
53. Stacey Dansky, Note, Eliminating Strict Employer Liability in Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
Cases, 76 TEX. L. REV. 435, 444-46 (1997) (citing Sims v. Brown & Root Indus. Servs. Inc., 78 F.3d 581
(5th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision), aff’g 889 F. Supp. 920 (W.D. La. 1995), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 817 (1996)).
54. Sims, 889 F. Supp. at 930, quoted in Dansky, supra note 53 at 445.

ISRAEL.DOC

09/29/03 9:53 AM

254 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

Volume 10:245

2003

was that some of the circuits were interpreting Title VII differently, and this dis55
crepancy needed to be resolved. The job of resolving that discrepancy naturally fell to the Supreme Court.
II. THE SUPREME COURT ENTERS THE DISCUSSION
A. Decisions Prior to Ellerth and Faragher
The Supreme Court ruled on its first sexual harassment case almost ten
years after lower courts had first weighed in. In 1977, the Court identified that
“a primary objective of Title VII is. . .to achieve equal employment opportunity
and to remove the barriers that have operated to favor white male employees
56
over other employees.” Until 1986, however, sexually harassed employees
likely could only look to forms of discrimination other than sex under Title VII
57
for guidance. Finally, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, a hostile environment
58
claim, the Supreme Court formally recognized sexual harassment as actionable.
In Meritor, the plaintiff, a bank teller, alleged that her supervisor had consistently harassed her over a four-year span by requesting sexual favors and re59
peatedly fondling and touching her. The defendant, a bank, contended that it
should be absolved of liability because the supervisor acted without its approval
60
or consent. The Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff that a hostile environment harassment claim violates Title VII when an employee is subjected to
severe or pervasive sexual harassment that constructively alters the terms or
61
conditions of her employment.
However, the Court declined to rule on the proper standard of employer li62
ability for hostile environment claims. Instead, the Supreme Court held that
employers are not automatically liable for supervisor sexual harassment, and
agreed with the EEOC that courts should look to agency principles for guid63
ance. It noted that “courts have consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory discharges of employees by supervisory personnel, whether or not
the employer knew, should have known, or approved of the supervisor’s ac64
tions.” Thus, in distinguishing between the hostile environment situation in
Meritor and an incident that leads to “discriminatory discharge,” the Court recognized a difference between hostile environment claims and quid pro quo harassment, yet it later acknowledged that this difference between the terms served
a limited purpose in the holding, which was focused on the hostile environment

55. Dansky, supra note 53, at 446.
56. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364 (1977) (citing Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)).
57. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
58. Id. at 64 (holding that “[w]ithout question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on the basis of sex”).
59. Id. at 60.
60. Id. at 61.
61. See id. at 65-66.
62. Id. at 72.
63. Id. A further discussion on agency principles will follow in Section IV.
64. Id. at 70-71.
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65

claim. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, described hostile environment as “non quid pro quo” and seemed to equate quid pro quo with economic
66
loss, however this idea was not further explored.
Ironically, the Court in Meritor was one vote away from potentially eradicating the confusion and debate over the standard of liability that has existed
over the past twenty-five years. As will be discussed again in Section IV, four
justices, led by Justice Marshall, supported a strict liability standard for hostile
67
work environment harassment as well as quid pro quo. Had that minority
turned into a 5-4 majority, the debate today might be limited to scholars, as
courts would have little reason to draw a bright line between quid pro quo and
hostile environment. But Justice Marshall’s concurrence remained just that, and
though the Supreme Court mirrored lower courts in holding that quid pro quo
68
harassment conditions employment or promotion on sexual favors, questions
and confusion remained. In 1998, the Court took up the issue again and decided
what remain today the two definitive holdings on sexual harassment.
B. Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
1. The Facts of Each Case
In Ellerth, the plaintiff, Kimberly Ellerth, quit her job as a salesperson after
fifteen months due to consistent sexual harassment by one of her supervisors,
69
Ted Slowik, a mid-level manager. She alleged that Slowik threatened to deny
her tangible job benefits or punish her for not acceding to his sexual demands,
yet she never suffered retaliation and never told anyone in authority about
Slowik’s conduct, despite knowing that Burlington had a policy against sexual
70
harassment.
In Faragher, Beth Ann Faragher had worked part-time for five years as a
lifeguard in Boca Raton when she brought an action alleging that two of her
71
immediate supervisors created a “sexually hostile atmosphere.” She cited repeated incidents of touching, lewd remarks, and threats of harsher work as72
signments against her and other female lifeguards. Faragher claimed that the
incidents amounted to discrimination in the “terms, conditions, and privileges”
73
of her employment.

65. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998).
66. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
67. See id. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring).
68. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (holding that Title VII is not solely
limited to conduct that seriously affects an individual’s psychological well being).
69. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747-48.
70. Id.
71. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 780-81.
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2. The Ellerth and Faragher Decisions
a) The Majority Opinions
These two separate opinions, one written by Justice Souter and one written
by Justice Kennedy, validated hostile environment claims and led to one uniform rule. In the process, the terms “quid pro quo” and “hostile work environment” lost much of their force. In Ellerth, Justice Kennedy commented on the
terms’ usefulness, stating that they “are helpful, perhaps, in making a rough
demarcation between cases in which threats are carried out and those where
74
they are not or are absent altogether, but beyond this are of limited utility.”
Thus, after Faragher and Ellerth were decided, these terms were no longer con75
trolling for employer liability purposes. Instead, liability, or the avoidance of
76
liability, turned on whether or not a tangible employment action was taken.
The Court in Ellerth held:
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability
or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence . . . . The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and
(b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise. . . . No affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge,
77
demotion, or undesirable reassignment.

Though the Supreme Court asserted that there is no affirmative defense for
quid pro quo, it does not appear to have explained why. The Court cited Title
VII legislative policy to justify permitting defenses for hostile work environment
claims, but did not explain why this policy would exclude defenses when a tan78
gible employment action is taken. Instead, the Court stated that a tangible employment action taken by the supervisor becomes, for Title VII purposes, the act
79
of the employer.
As a result of Ellerth and Faragher, a Title VII claimant who refuses the unwelcome advances of her supervisor and suffers a tangible employment action
may recover against the employer without showing any fault on the part of the
employer. But when no tangible employment action is taken, the employer is
permitted to present an affirmative defense to rebut the presumption of vicari80
ous liability. That is, the employer must prove that it exercised reasonable care
to prevent and correct any harassing behavior and that the employee failed to

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751.
Id. at 765; see Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
Id.
See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
See id. at 804-05.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
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take advantage of any of the employer’s corrective or preventive opportunities.
These “quid without quo” cases, exemplified by Ellerth and Faragher, are threats
that result in neither reprisal nor submission, and are actionable only as hostile
82
environment claims. Therefore, the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile environment now turns on whether there has been a tangible employment
action, in essence, whether there has been an action that “constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
83
significant change in benefits.”
In discussing employer liability, the Court noted that the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile work environment should not be used as a
method of determining employer liability for discrimination against an em84
ployee. Instead, “[t]he principal significance of the distinction is to instruct that
Title VII is violated by either explicit or constructive alterations in the terms or
conditions of employment and to explain that the latter must be severe or perva85
sive.” The “explicit” alteration encompasses quid pro quo actions, while the
constructive alterations include hostile environment actions. The distinction
between explicit and constructive alterations is also based on a judicial policy,
86
namely that the former should be treated more harshly than the latter.
Notably, the Court did not “suggest the terms quid pro quo and hostile work
87
environment are irrelevant to Title VII litigation.” In fact, the terms are particularly relevant when “they illustrate the distinction between cases involving a
88
threat which is carried out and offensive conduct in general.” The Court also
noted that prior to these two decisions, a plaintiff would have every incentive to
tailor her claim into a quid pro quo case, as it was the only form of sexual har-

81. Id.
82. See id; Faragher, 524 U.S. 775.
83. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. The EEOC offers three criteria with which to determine whether a
change in a job constitutes a tangible employment action: 1) A tangible employment action is the
means by which the supervisor brings the official power of the employer to bear on subordinates, as
demonstrated by: an official act of the enterprise, which is usually documented in official company
records, that may be subject to review by higher level supervisors, and often requires the formal approval of the enterprise and use of its internal processes; 2) A tangible employment action usually
inflicts direct economic harm; 3) A tangible employment action usually can only be caused by a supervisor or other person acting with the authority of the company. Examples of such an action include hiring and firing, promotion and failure to promote, demotion, undesirable reassignment, a
decision causing a significant change in benefits, compensation decisions and work assignment.
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY
SUPERVISORS, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL (BNA) N:4078 (June 18, 1999).
84. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752.
85. Id.
86. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 796 (finding that quid pro quo is used by courts “to cover the unordered and unauthorized acts of the servant for which it is found to be expedient to charge the master
with liability, as well as to exclude other acts for which it is not”) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B.
DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON, & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 502
(5th ed. 1984)).
87. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753.
88. Id.
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assment that led to an employer’s vicarious liability.
90
pro quo “put expansive pressure on the definition.”

2003

This desire to find a quid

b) The Dissenting Opinions
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote a dissenting opinion in Ellerth, and authored the dissent in Faragher as well. Primarily, Justice Thomas
reasoned that “absent an adverse employment consequence, an employer cannot
91
be held vicariously liable if a supervisor creates a hostile work environment.”
He would restore employer liability for racial and sexual harassment to a parallel status and “hold an employer liable for a hostile work environment only if
92
the employer is truly at fault.”
His dissent in Ellerth also suggested that the Court’s decision is in “considerable tension” with its earlier Meritor holding “that employers are not strictly
93
liable for a supervisor’s sexual harassment.” Thus, Justice Thomas argued that
the Court identified an affirmative defense, “based solely on its divination of Title VII’s gestalt,” and provided little instruction as to how employers can actually
94
avoid liability. As a result, the dissent issued a warning about the inevitable
result of the Court’s holding: “There will be more and more litigation to clarify
applicable legal rules in an area in which both practitioners and the courts have
95
long been begging for guidance.” Section III will consider the prescience of the
dissent’s view.
3. The Supreme Court since 1998
The Supreme Court has only explicitly dealt with sexual harassment once
since its 1998 decisions. In Breeden, a per curiam opinion involving co-workers’
allegedly offensive reaction to a non-employee’s sexually explicit comment, the
Court did not break any new ground, affirming the Ellerth and Faragher holdings
96
as reiterations of “what was plain from our previous decisions.” The Court did
not otherwise add to those decisions, as it found Breeden to involve a single incident of sexual innuendo, that “[n]o reasonable person could have believed . . .
97
violated Title VII’s standard.” Thus, Ellerth and Faragher remain the Court’s
decisive opinions on sexual harassment law.
III. HOW LOWER COURTS HAVE FOLLOWED THE SUPREME COURT SINCE 1998
Federal case law over the past few years demonstrates that most courts
have followed the Ellerth and Faragher holdings, albeit with some variation and
confusion. As will be discussed in Section V, lower courts, particularly the Fifth
Circuit, have further clarified the standard by devising an easier-to-follow road
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 810 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 774 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 773.
Id.
Id. at 774.
Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001) (per curiam).
Id. at 271.
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map that sets forth the questions to be asked in a tangible employment action
claim.
Many courts acknowledge that the Supreme Court has counseled against
employing the traditional categories of quid pro quo and hostile work environment, yet these courts still utilize the terminology and still sometimes cite to
98
cases prior to 1998, thus maintaining the terms’ existence. Further analysis of
several holdings will help illustrate the subtle paradox. For example, the Second
99
Circuit in Gregory v. Daly stated that the traditional categories now have limited
100
utility, following the trend of the Supreme Court. In contrast, a district court
was willing to address each claim separately when a plaintiff set forth both quid
101
pro quo and hostile work environment as distinct causes of action. This court
referred to Second Circuit opinions decided before 1998 in setting out a prima
102
facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment.
A district court in the Eighth Circuit, meanwhile, cited the 1986 Meritor
opinion as grounds for the distinction between quid pro quo claims and hostile
103
environment claims and observed that both are cognizable under Title VII.
Then the court relied upon Ellerth and Faragher, stating that in supervisor harassment cases, the two traditional terms are useful only to illustrate the evidentiary distinction between cases in which the threats are carried out and those
104
featuring general offensive conduct. After following Eighth Circuit precedent
105
in laying out the factors for a quid pro quo claim, the district court determined
that the elements of hostile work environment harassment are similar to quid
pro quo, and that liability inevitably turns on whether or not a tangible em106
ployment action occurred. Thus, the district court ultimately reached the result that the Supreme Court envisioned; that is, a decision based on the existence
of a tangible employment action. Still, the reliance on quid pro quo and hostile
work environment terminology is greater than what was anticipated by Justice
Kennedy in the Ellerth opinion.
By contrast, other courts have taken the Supreme Court’s holding and developed new standards that effectively move beyond quid pro quo and hostile
work environment. For example, the Eleventh Circuit, following the Supreme
Court’s proscription, no longer continues to apply a bright-line distinction be98. See, e.g., EEOC v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. C 00-3079-MWB, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21271, at *17 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) to reference the
traditional categories but also discussing their limited relevancy); Gigliotti v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P.,
1:00-CV-217 (FJS/RFT), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20221, at *12-18 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that the Second Circuit had counseled against classification of quid pro quo and hostile work environment but
still applying the categories to the case at hand); Kraft v. Yeshiva Univ., 00 Civ. 4899 (RCO), 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16152, at *19-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (separating quid pro quo from hostile work environment by quoting Karibian, 14 F.3d at 777 and Harris, 510 U.S. at 21).
99. 243 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001).
100. See id. at 698.
101. Gigliotti, 2001 LEXIS 20221 at *12 n.5.
102. See id. at *16-17 (citing Carrero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989);
Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777-78 (2d Cir. 1994)).
103. Am. Home Prods., 2001 LEXIS 21271, at *17 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752).
104. Id. at *18 (citing Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1006 (8th Cir. 2000)).
105. See id. (quoting Ogden, 214 F.3d at 1006 n.8).
106. See id. at *18, *21-22.

ISRAEL.DOC

260 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

09/29/03 9:53 AM

Volume 10:245

2003

tween the two claims and instead distinguishes between the two based on
107
whether there was a finding of a tangible employment action.
Although the
Circuit formerly analyzed the two claims under “slightly varying tests,” current
108
analysis indicates a willingness to move beyond the distinction. This willingness materializes into a new standard, bereft of any mention of quid pro quo or
hostile environment. In the Eleventh Circuit, to establish a prima facie case of
sexual harassment, the plaintiff must show:
(1) that she belongs to a protected group; (2) that she has been subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on her sex; (4) that
the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment; and (5) that there is a basis for holding the employer li109
able.

The quid pro quo and hostile work environment claims are combined under the
fourth element, with any one quid pro quo situation satisfying the test. Under
the fifth element, however, the basis for liability differs; under quid pro quo the
standard is a finding of a tangible employment action, and under hostile work
environment the standard is the severe or pervasive harassment coupled with
the absence of an affirmative defense.
The Fifth Circuit, in an opinion that will form part of the argument in Section V, also laid out an easy-to-follow “Ellerth/Faragher road map” that follows
the Supreme Court and employs the terms quid pro quo and hostile environ110
ment only to clarify the two forms of harassment. In the first step, courts determine whether the complaining employee has suffered a tangible employment
111
action. If she has, the suit is classified as a “quid pro quo” case; if not, the suit
112
is a “hostile environment” case.
Then there is a fork in the Ellerth/Faragher
road: In the second step of a quid pro quo case, courts determine if the tangible
employment action resulted from the employee’s acceptance or rejection of her
107. Pipkins v. City of Temple Terrace, 267 F.3d 1197, 1200 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001).
108. Id. (citing Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv. Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 508 n.7 (11th Cir.
2000)).
109. Id. at 1199-1200 (citing Johnson, 234 F.3d at 508) (applying test from Mendoza v. Borden, Inc.,
195 F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1068 (2000)).
110. See Casiano v. AT&T Corp., 213 F.3d 278, 283-84 (5th Cir. 2000). For more cases applying the
Ellerth/Faragher road map, see, for example, Gage v. VIJ, Inc., No. 4:00 CV-1672-BE, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18213 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (denying a claim of quid pro quo harassment because the employee
did not suffer a tangible employment action); Clardy v. Silverleaf Resorts, Inc., N. 3:99-CV-2893-P,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16481 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (granting summary judgment because employee failed
to prove any adverse changes relating to her job condition or status); Ratts v. Bd. of County
Comm’rs, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (D. Kan. 2001) (finding employee’s fear of losing her job unrealized
and arguing that mental anguish is outside the scope of quid pro quo claims).
111. Casiano, 213 F.3d at 283 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-62). What actually constitutes a tangible employment action can vary depending on the court. See, e.g., Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ.,
220 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding no adverse employment action where plaintiff only lost part of
his job title for ten days); Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding no tangible employment action where plaintiff, after complaining of harassment, was assigned to a different work
schedule); cf. Mallinson-Montague v. Pocrnick, 224 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2000) (denying employer
judgment as a matter of law where plaintiffs claimed they suffered tangible employment actions because, after they rejected their supervisor’s sexual advances, he began taking steps to diminish their
commissions and bonuses and put their jobs in jeopardy).
112. Casiano, 213 F.3d at 283.
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113

supervisor’s alleged harassment. If the employee cannot demonstrate a nexus,
then the employer is not vicariously liable under Title VII; if the employee can
show a nexus, then the employer is vicariously liable per se and not entitled to
114
raise the affirmative defense available in hostile environment cases.
Thus,
when the employee establishes a causal nexus between the tangible employment
action she suffered and her acceptance or rejection of her supervisor’s sexual
115
harassment, the employer is vicariously liable, ipso facto, and the inquiry ends.
Proximity in time, by itself, does not establish sufficient causation between the
tangible employment action and the employee’s acceptance or rejection of her
116
supervisor’s alleged harassment. In this scheme, “quid pro quo” and “hostile
work environment” are used to demarcate the first step, but “tangible employment action” is used to determine the crucial nexus between the quid and the
quo.
The availability of affirmative defenses under this new structure turns on
the existence, or lack thereof, of an employment action. Yet despite this clarification, sexual harassment that involves a tangible employment action is still
subject to varied interpretations, and employers in at least one circuit may not be
117
completely out of hope. In the Tenth Circuit, the employer may refute a tangible employment action claim in one of two ways: (1) by proving that it took no
negative employment action, e.g., the employee resigned; or (2) “by establishing
that the decision to terminate was made for legitimate business reasons and not
118
because the employee refused to submit to sexual demands.” Of course, this
may just be a formal instruction in how to disprove a nexus. Thus, courts have
not been uniform in following the Supreme Court’s holdings, though all apply it
in some form, and some, such as the Fifth Circuit, have established a modified
119
framework that simplifies application.
IV. THE DEBATE OVER QUID PRO QUO’S EXISTENCE
Despite the apparent relative ease with which many courts have dealt with
sexual harassment over the last several years, many scholars and commentators
still debate the viability of quid pro quo and the utility of maintaining it as a
distinct cause of action. This section focuses on various criticisms of quid pro
quo, and then contrasts them with critics who believe it is important to maintain
quid pro quo or tangible employment action harassment as a separate category.

113. Id. (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753-54). If no tangible employment action is taken, then the
road map takes a different path and the employer may raise an affirmative defense to absolve itself
of liability. See, e.g., Jackson v. Ark. Dep’t of Educ., 272 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding the employer’s harassment prevention policy to be effective, and because employee failed to take advantage of this policy, employer was not subject to vicarious liability on a hostile environment claim).
114. Casiano, 213 F.3d at 283-84 (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808).
115. Casiano, 213 F.3d at 284.
116. Clardy v. Silverleaf Resorts, Inc., N. 3:99-CV-2893-P, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16481, *15 (N.D.
Tex. 2001) (citing Hass v. ADVO Sys., Inc., 168 F.3d 732, 733 (5th Cir. 1999)).
117. See Smith v. Cashland, Inc., 193 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 1999).
118. See id. at 1160.
119. See discussion in Section V.
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A. Unanswered Questions After Ellerth/Faragher
While most courts have followed the Supreme Court’s lead, not all commentators agree with the Court’s logic or its brevity in discussing sexual harassment. In short, critics contend that the Court’s decisions have left several
questions unanswered. For example, the Ellerth and Faragher opinions did not
identify the “quantum of causation” necessary between the supervisor’s acts of
120
hostility and the employee’s subsequent tangible job detriment. Consequently,
a victim could be subject to extensive outrageous sexual conduct that never
leads to a tangible job action, and thus her claim would be subject to the employer’s affirmative defenses, whereas a victim subject to one isolated threat,
which is followed later by a negative job action, need not worry about the em121
ployer’s liability.
Additionally, the Court never explained why not allowing
the hostile environment affirmative defenses to be utilized in quid pro quo cases
was justified by Title VII’s legislative policy; it only stated that no affirmative
122
defense was available.
The affirmative defenses were defined for claims involving no tangible employment action; however, what is necessary for employers to successfully raise the defenses is not clear from the holding, which forces
123
lower courts to make the determination on a case-by-case basis.
Furthermore, in a question that will be taken up in Part V, the Supreme
Court did not discuss what level of liability should apply to tangible employment action claims when a clear quid pro quo demand results in a tangible job
124
detriment or submission to the sexual demands. As a result, the legal effect of
such a demand and the degree of retaliation by the supervisor necessary to state
125
a quid pro quo claim are still unclear . The Supreme Court avoided making
this determination by subtly redefining quid pro quo claims as tangible em126
ployment actions. Despite this subtle redefinition of harassment claims based
on the existence of a tangible employment action, as subsequent court holdings
demonstrate, a distinction between the quid pro quo and hostile environment
labels persists, even though the Supreme Court pronounced that the categories
127
are not controlling in establishing an employer’s liability.
Even if the terms
may not themselves account for liability, courts still apply the two categories
128
freely to aid their analysis and ultimate determinations.

120. Aden, supra note 7, at 508.
121. Id. This problem of not having to prove a nexus in a quid pro quo claim was addressed by
the Fifth Circuit in Casiano v. AT&T Corp., 213 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2000), but not by the Supreme
Court.
122. Brian C. Baldrate, Note, Agency Law and the Supreme Court’s Compromise on “Hostile Environment” Sexual Harassment in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
31 CONN. L. REV. 1149, 1177 (1999); see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808.
123. Tara Kaesebier, Employer Liability in Supervisor Sexual Harassment Cases: The Supreme Court
Finally Speaks, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 203, 227 (1999).
124. Aden, supra note 7, at 512.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Baldrate, supra note 122, at 1172.
128. See Section III.

ISRAEL.DOC

09/29/03 9:53 AM

QUID WITHOUT A QUO

263

B. Quid Pro Quo as a Superfluous and Otherwise Categorizable Form of
Harassment
The argument has been made, most notably by current Department of Labor Solicitor General Eugene Scalia, that there is no utility in distinguishing
129
between quid pro quo harassment and hostile environment harassment. Just
before the Supreme Court ruled in Ellerth and Faragher, Scalia argued that
“[q]uid pro quo owes its longevity to the triumph of form over substance in the
130
application of discrimination law.” He states that quid pro quo was substantively redundant of existing law “from the day it was recognized in Henson,”
131
and should be abandoned as a category.
By dividing quid pro quo into submission cases (in which the employee
submits to the demands for sex to avoid punishment) and retaliation cases (in
which the employee does not submit and suffers a tangible employment action),
Scalia’s argument, at least logically, makes sense. A retaliation case could be
classified as an adverse job action, albeit “an especially contemptible” one where
powerful direct evidence and heightened emotional impact may have a pro132
found effect on the jury, thus bearing on damages. Despite the reprehensible
nature of quid pro quo retaliation, Scalia feels placing it in a separate category is
133
superfluous.
In submission cases, meanwhile, Scalia argues that a woman forced to engage in unwanted sex with her supervisor to keep her job has merely satisfied
134
all of the elements of a claim for hostile work environment harassment. The
quid pro quo proposition is still important evidence, just as it is in an adverse
job action case; indeed, the quid pro quo submission case with its express threat
of retaliation will often prove stronger than many environmental harassment
135
claims. But, to Scalia, quid pro quo adds superfluous elements to other tests:
he cites the addition of “sexual advances” to the test for adverse job action and
the threat of job action or a promised job benefit in submission cases (an element
that can be omitted and yet still allow a hostile environment claim under Title
136
VII).
According to Scalia, these submission and retaliation cases do not require
quid pro quo treatment in order to be actionable as either adverse job action or
hostile environment sexual harassment claims, and thus quid pro quo requires
“a formal conditioning of employment on sex that the law itself does not demand, as the hostile environment cases show” and “injects needless formalism
129. Scalia, supra note 45, at 324.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 313-14. An adverse job action claim involves a decision to terminate, demote, refuse to
promote or hire, and other similar claims. Id. at 308.
133. Id. at 314, 308. See also Lucetta Pope, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Sexual Harassment But Were Too Politically Correct to Ask, 30 SW. U. L. REV. 253, 293 (2001) (contending that
rather than de-commissioning sexual harassment law, courts should limit its independence by forcing all sexual harassment claims to join non-sexual harassment and adverse job action claims, and
abandon “sexual attraction” as proof of discriminatory intent).
134. Scalia, supra note 45, at 316.
135. Id. at 317.
136. Id.
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137

and complexity to the analysis of employment discrimination.” Thus, viewing
quid pro quo retaliation as an adverse job action and submission as a hostile
work environment situation would eliminate the need to retain quid pro quo as
138
a separate category of discrimination. Such an elimination would not dramatically decrease an employer’s liability, since employers are held strictly liable in
139
adverse job action cases, just as they are in quid pro quo retaliation cases. Of
course, as will be argued later, such an elimination would remove quid pro quo,
and now tangible employment, from its own distinct and recognizable category.
Steven Aden, Chief Litigation Counsel for the Rutherford Institute, articulates a contrary view. Aden counters that Scalia really seeks a return to a single
structure of liability and thus Scalia’s argument is “nothing less than a well140
cloaked assault upon the citadel of sexual harassment law itself.”
Yet Aden
believes that the distinction between quid pro quo and hostile work environment is a continuum, rather than a divide, since both impact women in a similar
fashion: that is, both lead the victim to submit, quit, or inevitably get fired for
141
“cause.” Furthermore, any woman who receives a harassing threat or promise
may not have suffered a tangible employment action, but “thereafter labors under the condition that her prospects for advancement have been severely diminished by her non-compliance, and may yet again be elevated by a decision to
142
provide the sexual favors demanded.”
By arguing how damaging such a
threat may be, even though it would only qualify as a hostile environment
claim, Aden demonstrates that hostile environment and quid pro quo actions
can be very similar. In so doing, he at least slightly merges his analysis with
Scalia’s. However, unlike Aden, Scalia concludes that because both forms of
sexual harassment result from a supervisor misusing his inherent power, an
employer’s liability in all cases should be the same, in essence, liable only if it
143
endorses the conduct.
C. A Variety of Possibilities on Liability
What form of liability should apply to employers in sexual harassment
cases? Should different standards of liability be imposed based on whether or
not there is a tangible employment action? These questions are paramount to
this entire discussion, because there might not be a valid reason to retain quid
pro quo as a separate category of harassment if the standard is the same for all

137. Id. at 319. Additionally, because quid pro quo refers to both retaliation and submission
cases, the term is overly broad, as it does not specify whether there was a threat or promise, a submission or resistance, whether a job was gained or lost, or if the damages were economic or emotional. The term “quid pro quo” only conveys that the suit involves sex discrimination. This problem would be eliminated if quid pro quo were eliminated altogether as a separate category of
harassment, or if retaliation cases were subsumed into adverse job claims and quid pro quo were to
comprise submission cases only. Then, at least, the term would succinctly describe the harassment
scenario at issue. Id. at 316.
138. Id. at 320.
139. Baldrate, supra note 122, at 1169 (citing Scalia, supra note 45, at 321).
140. Aden, supra note 7, at 491.
141. Id. at 495 (quoting Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 834 (1991)).
142. Id. at 498.
143. Scalia, supra note 45, at 323.
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144

Despite the crucial importance of resolving this issue,
forms of harassment.
the question of an employer’s standard of liability has not been dealt with by the
145
Supreme Court since Meritor, and thus remains a constant source of confusion.
1. Four-Justice Concurrence in Meritor
Scalia’s argument that liability in quid pro quo and hostile environment
cases should be the same almost became the law, though not in the way Scalia
intended, when the debate and confusion over sexual harassment was still in a
fledgling state over fifteen years ago. In Meritor, a four-Justice concurrence led
by Justice Marshall advocated strict liability for all forms of sexual harassment,
146
and fell just one Justice short of making strict liability the majority rule. Justice
Marshall stated:
A supervisor’s responsibilities do not begin and end with the power to hire, fire,
and discipline employees, or with the power to recommend such actions.
Rather, a supervisor is charged with the day-to-day supervision of the work environment and with ensuring a safe, productive workplace. There is no reason
why abuse of the latter authority should have different consequences than abuse
of the former. In both cases it is the authority vested in the supervisor by the
employer that enables him to commit the wrong: it is precisely because the supervisor is understood to be clothed with the employer’s authority that he is
147
able to impose unwelcome sexual conduct on subordinates.

Justice Marshall contended that a supervisor was aided by his inherent power in
both forms of sexual harassment and that the law of agency, which dismisses liability for an employer when a supervisor is acting outside the scope of employment, did not justify establishing a special rule requiring notice for employ148
ers in hostile environment cases. Justice Marshall concluded that all sexual
harassment should be subject to strict liability and his opinion fell just one jus149
tice short of settling the issue.
2. Theories of Liability
In the absence of a bright-line rule, courts and commentators have used
varying rationales and theories in establishing what standard of employer liability should apply in sexual harassment cases. Many courts have relied upon
150
agency principles. For example, the Supreme Court in Meritor, and later in Ellerth and Faragher, determined that Congress intended to apply agency princi151
ples to determine an employer’s liability in sexual harassment cases.
The
144. See id. at 322.
145. Aden, supra note 7, at 481.
146. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 74 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 76-77.
148. Id. at 77.
149. See id. at 78. Marshall concluded that because employers are subject to strict liability in quid
pro quo cases, the same standard should apply to hostile work environment matters.
150. Aden, supra note 7, at 488-89.
151. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (arguing that Congress intended to apply agency principles to guide
courts in deciding harassment cases because Title VII’s definition of “employer” includes any
“agent” of an employer); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 790-91 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759-760 (1998).
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Court did not base its holdings solely on agency law, but adapted agency con152
cepts to Title VII’s objectives. It drew on principles from the Restatement (Sec153
ond) of Agency in establishing vicarious liability.
Therefore, the justification
for holding an employer liable for a supervisor’s actions flows from the agency
relationship—it centers around the fact that this relationship provides the supervisor with the power to commit the harassment and to make decisions af154
fecting the terms and conditions of the employee’s employment. At least one
155
circuit places this agency concept under the theory of respondeat superior.
The aid of the agency relationship is especially important to the supervisor
when he takes a tangible employment action against an employee. Since the
employer has given the supervisor power to take such actions, the decisions are
thus considered “official acts” of the employer, and the “aided by the agency
relation” standard always applies when a tangible employment action takes
156
place. This theory has been used by the Supreme Court in subjecting employers to strict liability for supervisors’ tangible employment actions. Of course,
not everyone agrees that this should be the case.
3. Objections to Strict Liability
The most common arguments against the application of strict liability and
agency principles to quid pro quo harassment are: (1) that the supervisor is not
acting with the alleged authority; (2) that negligence liability is a better standard;
and (3) that neither strict liability nor negligence liability considers the best interests of all parties involved.
The question of whether the supervisor is acting with apparent authority,
as the Restatement (Second) of Agency suggests, is crucial. In a quid pro quo
submission case, the supervisor is demanding sexual favors, which he has no
157
authority to do, as should be clear from company policy and harassment laws.
Furthermore, as Scalia argues, a quid pro quo harasser acts with no more
authority than a boss guilty of severe or pervasive hostile environment harass158
ment. Because of this lack of difference in authority, the supervisor in his capacity is using the same power supplied by the company despite company pol-

152.
153.

See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802 n.3; Baldrate, supra note 122, at 1164.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958), stating:

A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of
their employment, unless . . . (d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the
principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.
See also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802.
154. Baldrate, supra note 122, at 1167; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803-04; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 75960.
155. See, e.g., Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 514 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding employer automatically
liable under traditional agency principles because quid pro quo harassment was established). Other
courts have described the agency principles under a scope-of-employment theory of liability. See,
e.g., Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., 29 F.3d 103, 106-07 (3d Cir. 1994) (arguing that “[s]cope-ofemployment liability is often invoked in quid pro quo cases because the supervisor has used his
authority over the employee’s job to extort sexual favors”).
156. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760-61.
157. Scalia, supra note 45, at 322-23.
158. Id. at 323.
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icy prohibiting his actions, and thus the standard of employer liability in both
159
cases should be identical.
Alternately, a uniform standard of liability for employers could be imposed
160
in all sexual harassment cases if the negligence standard were adopted.
Yet
the likelihood of negligence becoming a standard is certainly lower since the
Supreme Court has moved toward strict liability. The debate over whether to
apply a negligence standard or a strict liability standard goes to the heart of sexual harassment laws: that is, the employer’s ability to protect employees from
being victimized in the workplace. When an employer is subject to strict liability, the employer will be held liable without any inquiry into preventative or
corrective actions it has taken. Under strict liability, the employer may have little incentive to take such measures, potentially resulting in less protection for,
161
and more harm to, women in the workplace. If the employer is given the opportunity to avoid liability via affirmative defenses or negligence liability, it
must assume the responsibility of not only establishing a grievance procedure,
but also investigating all complaints and taking action if it believes it to be nec162
essary to defend against employee claims.
Thus, as legal scholar Allan King
notes, not only must the employer disclaim in writing the lack of authority of
supervisors to make good on quid pro quo threats, employees must also sense
that management will act upon their quid pro quo complaints and protect them
163
from their supervisor and possible retaliation if they report.
Issues in sexual harassment are seen more clearly when the situation is
viewed not as a bilateral relationship, but a trilateral one, in which the employer,
164
employee, and supervisor are all involved. The culpable supervisor takes actions which both result in a loss of efficiency to the employer and impose addi165
tional emotional and, sometimes, financial costs on the employee.
The employer has a stake in avoiding a workplace in which sex and blackmail, as
166
opposed to merit, determine pay and promotions.
However, the supervisor
would rather keep his employer—the only party with the power to prevent the
tangible employment action, or once it occurs, to mitigate its effects—in the
167
dark.
Thus, the employer is only capable of prevention or mitigation if the
employee informs and cooperates with it, which places a disproportionate
168
amount of pressure on the employee to avoid a fear of retaliation and respond.
Thus, strict liability would fail to ally the employer (who is stuck with liability
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Baldrate, supra note 122, at 1169 (arguing that the establishment of negligence as the
one standard would create a bright-line standard in all harassment cases). Others, however, feel
negligence might not work. See, e.g., Aden, supra note 7, at 501 (contending that if negligence was
the standard for quid pro quo claims, the employee’s right to relief might be subject to the supervisor’s knowledge of how far he can legally go before his employer will be subject to liability).
161. See Dansky, supra note 53, at 438.
162. Id. at 468.
163. Allan G. King, Resist and Report: A Policy to Deter Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 50 BAYLOR
L. REV. 333, 344 (1998).
164. Id. at 339.
165. Id. at 347-48.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 342.
168. Id.
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regardless of any corrective measures it seeks to take) and employee against the
harassing supervisor, and would limit the relationship to a bilateral one with the
169
employer effectively relegated to the sidelines.
The trilateral relationship
seems to fit the hostile environment claim as well, and indeed it may, which is
why some scholars care much less about the above arguments then they do establishing the same standard for both forms of sexual harassment in order to
170
eliminate confusion.
D. Quid Pro Quo as a Viable Separate Category
Despite the unanswered questions, arguments to the contrary, and disagreements over standard of liability, some feel that quid pro quo should remain
a separate category of sexual harassment. It will likely remain a distinct category
of Title VII discrimination so long as the Supreme Court retains different stan171
dards of liability for quid pro quo and hostile work environment claims. Yet,
quid pro quo stands “no longer as a prescriptive cause of action, but now as a
descriptive paradigm of a type of harassment sufficiently egregious to impose
172
strict liability on the employer.”
It was never meant to be a definition, but
rather a label for the range of situations that involve a “conditioning of terms of
173
employment on sexual favors sufficient to give rise to employer liability.”
Quid pro quo varies from hostile work environment in both function and
rationale. It differs in function because hostile work environment claims only
hold actionable hostility in the workplace that is sufficiently “severe and pervasive” as to alter the terms and conditions of employment. By contrast, all quid
174
pro quo claims are actionable. It differs in rationale because, taken alone, a singular hostile environment action does not hinder a female employee’s performance, rather multiple actions create a severe effect over time, giving rise to conduct which is prohibited because it creates “a pervasive atmosphere of
175
hostility.” In contrast, quid pro quo conduct is harmful in essence because any
one action can immediately “brutalize and demotivate” an employee, even if
176
never repeated again. These differences in function and rationale underlie the
argument for keeping the two categories of harassment separate.

169. See id. at 334.
170. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 45, at 323; see also Baldrate, supra note 122, at 1171.
171. Aden, supra note 7, at 479.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 486.
175. Id. at 493.
176. Id. at 494. Aden further argues that an employee-victim likely never knows how her supervisor will react. Her decision to submit is based on a guess as to whether or not the supervisor will
make good on his threat or promise, and if she resists, she is predicting that the supervisor will not
follow through. After all, if she submits and the supervisor does not carry through with a promise
of reward, the employee still cannot enforce a “quid pro quo contract.” Regardless, the supervisor
retains power over the state of the victim’s employment. Id. at 499.
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V. QUID PRO QUO’S EXISTENCE IN THE FUTURE
Long before quid pro quo (or even sexual harassment for that matter) was
well-defined in the discrimination lexicon, the Supreme Court offered a reminder of why Title VII exists— “to achieve equal employment opportunity and
to remove the barriers that have operated to favor white male employees over
177
other employees.” That reminder provides a valuable framework: the future
viability of quid pro quo and the standard of employer liability for sexual harassment should serve the purpose of removing barriers for women in the workplace. An employee’s status as a woman, and the ability of male supervisors to
take advantage of that fact, should not inhibit the workplace experience. With
this underlying purpose in mind and given the Supreme Court’s 1998 decisions
and subsequent lower court treatment, I argue that quid pro quo sexual harassment has been modified to the extent that, with the exception of submission
cases, it is better described now by using the phrase “tangible employment action.” The concept, however, of demanding sexual favors in exchange for some
form of employment action or inaction has remained much the same and the
distinction in terms may not indicate a corresponding difference in usage.
A. Quid Pro Quo’s Continued Vitality
Because Title VII originally targeted race, and gender discrimination was
added by motion on the House floor, sexual harassment law has been developed
178
almost entirely by the courts. The Supreme Court, with Faragher and Ellerth,
has taken a clear path in altering the terminology of quid pro quo claims by requiring a tangible employment action, which itself establishes a distinct form of
sexual harassment, and the Court has shown no signs in the last five years of
179
changing its approach. As it stands, a supervisor’s threats, without more, do
not qualify as a tangible employment action and are now classified under the
hostile environment category.
Since 1998, lower courts have set out to follow the Supreme Court’s lead,
developing new methods of enforcing the Court’s decision by further deemphasizing the term “quid pro quo” but not the concept from which it was
born. This is illustrated perfectly by the Fifth Circuit, which employs an easy-tofollow “Ellerth/Faragher” road map, or inquiry, that travels down the former
180
quid pro quo path by first searching for a tangible employment action.
If a
tangible employment action is found, according to the Fifth Circuit, a court must
determine if it resulted from the employee’s acceptance or rejection of her su181
pervisor’s alleged sexual harassment. This step requires proof of a nexus be182
tween the employment action and the harassment.
Of course, the Supreme
Court does not allow any affirmative defenses, but the Tenth Circuit’s Smith v.

177. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364 (1977) (vacating judgment on a
seniority system alleged to have violated Title VII).
178. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986); Aden, supra note 7, at 484.
179. See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001) (per curiam).
180. See Casiano v. AT&T Corp., 213 F.3d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 2000).
181. Id.
182. Id.
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Cashland decision reminds us that the defendant can still prove that either no
negative employment action was actually taken or that a termination decision
was based on legitimate reasons wholly unrelated to the employee’s refusal to
183
submit to sexual demands.
With the tangible employment action road map, no mention of “quid pro
quo” is necessary, yet the victimized employee has the same legal recourse
when subjected to the quid pro quo form of sexual harassment. An employee
who believes that she has been victimized will know whether or not a tangible
employment action such as a demotion or dismissal has occurred because such
actions are self-evident. If it has, she must prove that the employment action
was due either to her rejection or submission to a supervisor’s sexual advances.
If there has been no tangible employment action, in order to sustain a claim the
employee must demonstrate that a severe and pervasive hostile work environment has altered her employment experience.
Ultimately, these are not categories, but questions about what kind of action has taken place. The victimized employee need not fit her experience into a
category, but instead must evaluate her situation to see which path she must
travel down the Ellerth/Faragher road map. This is all accomplished without
employing the words “quid pro quo,” words which are no longer necessary to
accomplish Title VII’s goals of providing females with an equal employment experience. Rather, because liability is still attenuated by the same set of circumstances, the new terminology could conceivably make the victimized employee’s
claim easier to delineate with a path that is simpler to follow. In addition, the
employee does not have to worry about fitting her situation into the adverse job
action rubric, as Scalia would advocate, instead remaining within a further clari184
fied sexual harassment domain, one carved specifically for her situation.
B. Strict Liability for Tangible Employment Actions
It seems clear that sexual harassment involving tangible employment ac185
tions “poisons the workplace for all personnel, not just the victim.” The crucial inquiry is whether or not strict liability or allowing the employer to raise affirmative defenses will most effectively keep the “poison” from spreading.
Of the many arguments expressed, Judge Richard Posner’s is perhaps most
convincing. He argues in a Seventh Circuit case that the “company act” of an
employee suffering a tangible employment action gives the employer requisite
notice that something improper may have happened that requires prompt fur186
ther inquiry.
Judge Posner adds that, “[i]n a well-regulated company, a supervisor who wants to fire a subordinate has to obtain the approval of higherups . . . and they will have an opportunity therefore to determine the bona fides

183. Smith v. Cashland, Inc., 193 F.3d 1158, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999).
184. As noted earlier, moving tangible employment actions into the adverse job action category
would make it one of a number of claims that could qualify as an adverse job action. By remaining
within the sexual harassment domain, tangible employment actions retain the distinction as a separate category and ease-of-access that victims deserve.
185. King, supra note 163, at 345.
186. See Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 514-15 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J., concurring and dissenting).
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This well-reasoned argument acknowledges that an emof his proposal.”
ployer does not have to be helpless in these situations, because long before the
employee brings a claim, the employer has the opportunity to review the hiring,
firing and other employment decisions of its supervisors, particularly those decisions raising red flags. Presumably, the firing of a female employee who has
otherwise done satisfactory work will be greeted with skepticism in a well-run
company. A prudent employer, realizing that it does not have the ability to
raise affirmative defenses in tangible employment action harassment cases,
would be wise to review any job action that could have even a trace of taint.
This not only aids the employer but also keeps it allied with the employee in the
trilateral harassment relationship proffered in Section IV.
In cases where severe and pervasive hostile environment harassment has
occurred without any tangible employment action, the Supreme Court allows
the employer to raise an affirmative defense. According to the Court’s analysis,
allowing an affirmative defense supports Title VII’s legislative purpose “to recognize the employer’s affirmative obligation to prevent violations and give
188
credit here to employers who make reasonable efforts to discharge their duty.”
Because a hostile environment claim avoids conditioning work on sex, thus
steering clear of sexual blackmail, courts do not deem it to be as flagrant a viola189
tion of Title VII and allow affirmative defenses.
Yet, not only are tangible employment actions, which are conditioned on
the acceptance or rejection of sexual favors, flagrant and reprehensible enough
to earn strict liability for employers, they also have the potential to be thwarted
prior to their occurrence. Affirmative defenses certainly allow an employer to
demonstrate that it has developed solid harassment policies that an employee
can utilize, but effective employee policies are also those that avoid sexual harassment problems in the first place. While it may be a reality of society that no
workplace will completely escape the traces of harassment, anti-harassment
policies and training that threatens supervisors with immediate dismissal upon
the discovery of a request for sexual favors can reduce the problem before it begins and keep the workplace freer of sexual blackmail. If a supervisor takes advantage of his position and ignores company policy by demanding and receiving sexual favors from an employee by threatening her with job loss or a job
detriment, then the employer should be subject to strict liability and be forced to
tighten its watch over perpetrators of harassment in order to ensure that employee complaints and future employment actions taken against employees are
legitimate and defensible. The potential for litigation should be incentive
enough for the weary employer.
After all, respondeat superior liability involves the allocation of risk, and
how it should be spread. In a tangible employment action, the supervisor bears
the risk of being caught and punished while the employer bears the risk of a
suit. The employee, who has been degraded and humiliated by a sexual quid
pro quo, should never face the prospect that her inability or hesitation to follow

187.
188.
189.

Id. at 513.
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998).
Dansky, supra note 53, at 439-440.
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company policy inevitably leaves her as the loser while the other two sides of
the triangular relationship escape.
CONCLUSION
Congress could certainly amend Title VII to eliminate any distinction between quid pro quo and hostile environment claims, bringing one uniform stan190
dard of liability to all sexual harassment claims. In the meantime, the courts
have acted first in maintaining a continuum, and have turned a sexual harassment claim into a road map, the direction of which turns on whether or not the
employee has been subjected to a tangible employment action. The goal of Title
VII is to create an equal employment experience, and this is more likely to be
achieved if the employer is subject to more stringent standards that motivate
employers to develop more precise and effective employee harassment policies.
For this reason, imposing strict liability is a fair and just method of punishing an
employer when a supervisor conditions a tangible employment action on sexual
favors. The victimized employee should never bear the risk that such a reprehensible act will be, in essence, excused by the courts.
Equally important, the Supreme Court has acted to diminish use of the
term “quid pro quo,” and decisions of the lower courts indicate that it has succeeded. The quid pro quo concept, however, has certainly not disappeared and
has not lost its primary utility as a factual category that has a powerful impact
on juries. Better yet, today’s victim of sexual harassment likely would have an
easier time using the Ellerth/Faragher road map than she would have faced in defining the elements of quid pro quo. Instead of forcing her to fit her claim into a
category, the road map allows the employee to examine the facts of her situation, to answer certain questions, and to develop her claim based on whether or
not there has been a tangible employment action. This recent approach does
nothing to lessen the impact and power of Title VII, and only further helps to
protect a victim of sexual harassment in the modern workplace, which has been
the goal since Catherine MacKinnon first delineated standards for sexual harassment claims almost twenty-five years ago.

190.

Baldrate, supra note 122, at 1177.

